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HE sports pages today' contain many stories of professional ath-
letes and their contractual disputes.2 These disputes often arise
when a new sports league is formed to compete with an already
existing league. 3 Traditionally the new league offers significantly higher
salaries4 to star athletes during their option year 5 to lure them to the new
league and thus attract the attention and dollars of sports fans. Other con-
1. See, e.g., Bellinger Decides to Rejoin Tornado, Dallas Morning News, June 6, 1981,
§ B, at 5, col. I (professional soccer player who has signed contracts to play for teams in two
different leagues works out arrangement to play for both during different seasons); Hill Sings
Contract Blues, Earl Just Listens, Dallas Morning News, June 4, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 2 (two
professional football players' contract disputes turn in different directions); Pearson Wants
New Contract, Dallas Morning News, March 22, 1981, § B, at 1, col. I (star wide receiver is
upset with salary and wants to renegotiate existing contract); Oiler Assistant Coaches Re-
leasedby G.M. Herzeg, Dallas Morning News, Jan. 10, 1981, § B, at 3, col. 1 (football team
releases from their contracts six assistant coaches who want to leave team); Campbell De-
mands New Oiler Contract, Dallas Morning News, Jan. 8, 1981, § B, at 1, col. I (star football
player demands new $1 million per year contract with five years remaining on current con-
tract); Lions Hopingfor Return of English, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 30, 1980, § B, at 1,
col. I (football team tries to negotiate contract with star player sitting out season); Three
Ram Veterans End Holdout, Dallas. Morning News, Sept. 3, 1980, § B, at 6, col. 3 (three
football players return to team despite contract disputes); Redskins Retire Riggins, Dallas
Morning News, Sept. 1, 1980, § B, at 3, col. 4 (football team refuses to negotiate with player
in contract dispute); Luksa, NFL Facing Contract Revolt by Players, The Dallas Times Her-
ald, Aug. 26, 1980, § D, at 1, col. I (football league suffers from contract disputes).
2. Contract disputes are by no means a new problem in professional sports. See, e.g.,
Allegheny Base-ball Club v. Bennett, 14 F. 257 (W.D. Pa. 1882).
3. See Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir.
1969) (newly formed American Basketball Association competing with existing National
Basketball Association); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (newly formed World Hockey Association
competing with existing National Hockey League); Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515
S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (newly formed World
Football League competing with existing National Football League). For a discussion of the
context in which cases arise, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 4.03
(1979).
4. See Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 148 (S.D. Ohio 1974)
(impact of new league on salaries). Another case illustrating the dramatic impact on players'
salaries that a new league may have is Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F.
Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (Ist Cir. 1972). In Cheevers a team in the
then new World Hockey Association offered a player a contract providing for a salary of
$200,000 per year for seven years. The player's previous team in the established National
Hockey League had offered him only a one-year contract for $70,000. 348 F. Supp. at 264.
5. The option year is an additional year following the original term of a player's con-
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texts in which player contract problems arise include an acquiring team's
transfer of a player's contract as compensation for their signing of a free
agent 6 from another team7 or a team's changing its mind after agreeing to
assign a player to the other team.8 Several cases have arisen when teams
in competing leagues draft the same player, who signs contracts with both
teams. 9 Sports personnel other than players have also been the subject of
heated contract disputes.' 0
The professional sports industry is founded upon the basic contract." If
the players were allowed to freely disregard their contractual obligations,
tract for which the club has the option to retain the player. See generally J. WEISTART & C.
LOWELL, supra note 3, § 5.03, at 516.
6. A free agent is a player who is no longer under any existing contractual obligation.
Id Free agent compensation is an arrangement whereby the club acquiring the services of a
free agent is required to transfer one or more players from its team to the team losing the
free agent. Id The purpose of this practice is to protect the relative competitive equality
throughout the league. The question of whether this procedure should be implemented in
professional baseball was the primary cause of the 1981 players' strike. Id See Miller Calls
for Strike as Meetings Break Off, Dallas Morning News, June 12, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 3;
Baseball Players Strike, Dallas Morning News, June 12, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 6; Baseball
Headingfor Strike, Dallas Morning News, June 11, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 1.
7. See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (involves
player who was part of compensation for star athlete who was picked up as free agent).
8. See Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club Partnership, 373
F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
9. See Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840
(1966); Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson, 186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La.), af d, 283 F.2d 657
(5th Cir. 1960); Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal.
1960). The court in Robinson expressed disgust for the questionable tactics used by the clubs
competing for players. Judge J. Skelly Wright noted:
This case is but another round in the sordid fight for football players, a fight
which begins before these athletes enter college and follows them through
their professional careers. It is a fight characterized by deception, double deal-
ing, campus jumping, secret alumni subsidization, semi-professionalism and
professionalism. It is a fight which has produced as part of its harvest this
current rash of contract jumping suits. It is a fight which so conditions the
minds and hearts of these athletes that one day they can agree to play football
for a stated amount for one group, only to repudiate that agreement the fol-
lowing day or whenever a better offer comes along. So it was with Johnny
Robinson.
186 F. Supp. at 934 (footnote omitted). Judge Wright also expressed dislike for the player's
own conduct in the matter and gave him the following memorable advice:
'... in four or five, six or eight years, some day your passes are going to
wobble in the air, you are not going to find that receiver. If you keep playing
around here, with these professionals, and others, and jumping your con-
tracts-you are all right this time,. . . but. . . some day your abilities will be
such that [your club] won't even send a twice disbarred attorney from
Dogpatch to help you. They sent some dandy ones this time. ... .'
Id at 935-36 (quoting from Chicago Cardinals Football Club, Inc. v. Etcheverry (D.N.M.
June 26, 1956) (unreported)). Similar disapprovals can be found in Washington Capitols
Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472, 479 (9th Cir. 1969), and Weegham v. Killefer,
215 F. 168, 169 (W.D. Mich.), afj'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914).
10. See New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196
(1st Cir. 1979). This case involves a university that sought to obtain the coaching services of
Coach Fairbanks who then was serving under an existing contract with a professional club.
11. See Brennan, Injunction Against Professional Athletes Breaching Their Contracts, 34
BROOKLYN L. REV. 61 (1967); Comment, Professional Athletic Contracts and the Injunctive
Dilemma, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. PROC. 437 (1975).
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the industry's existence would be threatened.12 Based on the premise that
dollar damages cannot be determined for the services of a lost athlete,' 3
the historic remedy available to the aggrieved club for a player's breach of
his contract has been the negative injunction.' 4 This Comment examines
the unique requirements for obtaining a negative injunction against a
breaching athlete, including a review of the competing policy considera-
tions that have affected this area of the law. The possibility of recovering
money damages from a breaching player is also discussed, along with pos-
sible methods of computing such damages.
I. THE AGGRIEVED CLUB'S TRADITIONAL REMEDY
As a general rule, personal service contracts will not be specifically en-
fored. 15 The policy considerations supporting this rule include the diffi-
culty of ensuring proper compliance with a court order,' 6 the
undesirability of forcing two parties to work together after friction devel-
ops between them,' 7 and public sentiment against involuntary servitude.' 8
Beginning with the nineteenth century English case Lumley v. Wagner, 19
courts of equity have granted relief in the form of a negative injunction
during the contractual period.20
The leading case of Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie2' established the
availability of negative injunctive relief in cases involving professional ath-
letes.22 By offering an increased salary, a competing team in the newly
formed American League persuaded the defendant, Napolean Lajoie, to
12. See Brennan, supra note 11, at 61; Comment, supra note 11, at 437.
13. See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 472 F.2d 127, 128 (1st Cir.
1972); Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 246 (1969); Central
N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506, 517 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1961).
14. See, e.g., Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902); Dallas
Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no
writ). The negative injunction prevents the athlete from performing for any club other than
the plaintiff.
15. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 379 (1932) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
16. See 5A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204, at 400-01 (1964); 11 S. WILLIS-
TON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1423, at 782-83 (3d ed. 1968); RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 15, § 379, Comment d.
17. See 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1204, at 400-01; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note
16, § 1423, at 783 n.3; RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 379, Comment d.
18. See 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1204, at 400-01; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note
16, § 1423, at 782-83.
19. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). The case involved a famous opera singer who had
contracted to perform a specified number of times in a theatre that the plaintiff had rented.
The contract also contained a promise not to perform for anyone else during the contract
period. Id at 688. The defendant broke this promise and made a contract to perform for
another theatre manager. Plaintiff brought suit to enforce the negative promise and the
court granted injunctive relief. Id at 693.
20. The negative injunction prevents the defendant from performing the same contrac-
tual duties for anyone other than the plaintiff for the remainder of the contract period. See
J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.02, at 340.
21. 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 97.3 (1902).
22. See id; Comment, Enforcement Problems of Personal Service Contracts in Profes-
sional Athletics, 6 TULSA L.J. 40, 47 (1969).
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ignore his existing contract to play baseball with the plaintiff club. The
trial court refused to grant injunctive relief on two grounds: the plaintiff
failed to prove that the defendant possessed such unique ability that it
would be impossible to replace him, 23 and the contract lacked the requisite
mutuality.24 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court
on both points.25 First, the court rejected the restrictive requirement of
such unique skills that it would be impossible to replace him.26 Instead,
the court established a broader requirement that the player only have such
special knowledge, skill, and ability that his services could not easily be
replaced. 27 This lesser standard allows aggrieved teams to obtain the neg-
ative injunction against disloyal players more easily,28 and is compatible
with public policy favoring the enforcement of contracts whenever possi-
ble.
The Lajoie court also found that the contract contained the requisite
mutuality despite the fact that the club could bind the player for up to
three years, but the player could only bind the team for ten days. 29 Con-
sidering the peculiar circumstances of professional baseball, the court
noted that the terms were not unreasonable. 30 Furthermore, both parties
expressly accepted these terms at the beginning of their contractual rela-
tionship. Their inclusion was part of the inducement for the club to con-
tract with this player.3' Similarly, the fact that both parties did not have
the same remedies available for a breach by the other did not destroy mu-
tuality.32
Lajoie thus established the necessary prerequisites for obtaining nega-
tive injunctive relief against a breaching athlete. 33 These basic elements
include a sufficiently unique ability,34 an inadequate remedy at law, and
irreparable harm to the plaintiff.35 As a practical matter, once a player is
shown to be sufficiently unique, the inadequacy of damages is presumed.
Furthermore, inadequacy of damages generally is equated with irreparable
harm to the aggrieved club.36 Even if the above elements can be estab-
lished, injunctive relief is still within the court's discretion and maybe de-
23. 51 A. at 973.
24. Id at 974.
25. Id at 976.
26. Id at 973.
27. Id The court equated an inability to easily replace the athlete with the concepts of
inadequate remedy at law and irreparable harm, the essential prerequisites for obtaining
injunctive relief. Id at 973-74.
28. See generaly Comment, supra note 11, at 441.
29. 51 A. at 975; see notes 152-70 infra and accompanying text.
30. 51 A. at 974.
31. Id
32. Id at 975. In case of a breach the club could seek injunctive relief, but the player
could only recover damages. Id
33. See Note, Injunctions in Professional Athletes' Contracts-An Overused Remedy, 43
CONN. B.J. 538, 540 (1969).
34. While the term "unique" is not properly qualified, this Comment reflects the lan-
guage of many courts that, in deciding such cases, speak of degrees of uniqueness.
35. 51 A. at 973.
36. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.08.
[Vol. 35
COMMENTS
nied.37 In deciding whether to grant this relief the courts consider the
differing needs of the clubs, players, and society. The clubs desire stability
in contractual relationships 38 and the maintenance of a competitive bal-
ance. 39 The players need a competitive market for their services 4° and the
opportunity to perform.4' Society benefits from protecting the sanctity of
contracts and preventing restraints of competition. 42 The courts have ap-
plied the essential requirements for injunctive relief along with other eq-
uity principles such as unclean hands, 43 and lack of mutuality"4 to reach
equitable results in the cases before them.
A. Uniqueness
The outcome of many cases where negative injunctive relief is sought
against a breaching professional athlete is determined by whether the ath-
lete possesses sufficiently unique knowledge, skill, and ability, the loss of
which cannot adequately be remedied by damages.45 Consequently, the
pivotal question is how to decide if a player's skills are sufficiently unique.
The Lajoie decision established the proper standard for determining if the
player has the requisite talents and abilities. The court expressly rejected
an impossible-to-replace standard and adopted a lesser standard of not
easily replaceable.46 In deciding that the player's skills were sufficiently
unique, the court considered the player's reputation as a professional ath-
37. See, e.g., New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club,
Inc., 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961) (unclean hands of plaintiff); Nassau Sports v. Hampson,
355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972) (promotion of new league and harm to player outweigh
harm to club); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (harm to plaintiff not irreparable; needs of new league);
Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969) (unclean hands of
plaintiff); Connecticut Professional Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (lack of mutuality and harshness of contracts).
38. See Brennan, supra note 11; Comment, supra note 11, at 61.
39. See Goldstein, Out of Bounds Under the Sherman Act? Player Restraints in Profes-
sional Team Sports, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 285, 286 (1977).
40. See Bowman v. National Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Minn. 1975);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,
515 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
41. See Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (Douglas, J.) (stay
of order issued by Ninth Circuit); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1319
(D. Conn. 1977); Bowman v. National Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Minn.
1975).
42. See Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1974);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,
515 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
43. See notes 171-201 infra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 152-70 infra and accompanying text.
45. See Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 140 (S.D. Ohio 1974)
(outcome of players' contract cases "usually turns on whether the player is possessed of
certain unique knowledge, ability and skill"); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 876
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) ("[tjhe primary requisite for enforcing ...the contract . . . is that the
player be an athlete of exceptional talent"); Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris,
348 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ) (player must be "a person of
exceptional and unique knowledge, skill and ability").
46. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973, 973 (1902); see Comment,
supra note 11, at 441.
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lete,47 and his value to the team in terms of economics and the effect that
his absence would have on the team's standings.48 Thus, the court's find-
ing of uniqueness in Lajoie, although facilitated by the player's status as a
star athlete, 49 was based on the player's relative value to the team and not
simply his past record or reputation as a professional athlete. In more re-
cent cases, however, the courts have been criticized for ignoring the Lajoie
analysis and finding uniqueness based solely on the fact that the player is a
professional athlete.50 This broad view of uniqueness may not be objec-
tionable when a star athlete is involved and the parties concede the point,
as was the case in Nassau Sports v. Peters.5' Problems arise, however,
when the athletes involved are less than stellar performers.
In Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett52 the court determined
that the player was sufficiently unique despite the fact that he was not cho-
sen to play in the NBA All Star game, was not named in the U.S. Basket-
ball Writers' All-NBA Team, and was only a first year professional. 3 The
court noted that mere engagement as a basketball player in the National
Basketball Association, or American Basketball League, should carry with
it recognition of his excellence and extraordinary abilities.5 4 Some evi-
47. 51 A. at 974; see Brennan, supra note 11, at 64.
48. 51 A. at 974.
49. Id ("He may not be the sun in the baseball firmament, but he is certainly a bright
particular star."); see Brennan, supra note 11, at 64-65 ("Lajoie was one of the leading stars
of his day . . . . Lajoie was rather clearly a person of unique or exceptional skill. ... ).
When the player is a star athlete the policy considerations generally tend to weigh heavier
on the side of the aggrieved team. First, the team may have planned its strategy around the
player and the player may be a major gate attraction. Secondly, the player's need for expo-
sure and opportunity to play will be met. Of course, star athletes tend to receive higher
salaries.
50. See Brennan, supra note 11, at 70 ("Personally, I see little justification and no proof
for this assumption."); Comment, Contractual Rights and Duties ofthe Professional Athete-
Playing the Game in a Bidding War, 77 DICK. L. REV. 352, 360 (1972-1973) (the better analy-
sis requires an examination of all factors); Comment, supra note 11, at 441 (recent courts
have emasculated Lajoie test). This position was expressly stated in Nassau Sports v. Peters,
352 F. Supp. 870, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), and Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19
Ohio 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506, 514 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961). Winnipeg Rugby Football
Club v. Freeman, 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955), and Dallas Cowboys Football Club,
Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ), have also been dis-
cussed as supporting this proposition. See Comment, supra note 11, at 442; Note, supra note
33, at 544. A closer analysis of both Freeman and Harris, however, indicates that neither
case is compatible with that position. See notes 57-72 infra and accompanying text.
51. 352 F. Supp. 870, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
52. 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961).
53. 181 N.E.2d at 513-14.
54. Id at 514. The court broadly applied this analysis to all major sports. Id at 517.
This and similar language found in Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 876 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), suggests that some courts have applied an abstract theory in determining the player's
uniqueness. Under this theory the courts look only at the player's past performance, or
merely the player's status as a professional athlete in making the determination of unique-
ness. This type of analysis promotes the clubs' interest in stability as an injunction is easier
to obtain using this standard. Similarly, the public's interest in protecting the sanctity of
contracts is benefited. The player's interests, however, suffer under this analysis. If all play-
ers are presumed to be unique, then player mobility and the competitive market for salaries
will be stifled. The presumption that all star athletes are of high value to their teams is not
necessarily valid. A team might include a large number of star athletes, the loss of any one
having very little impact. This analysis also ignores the fact that many players can be re-
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dence of unique skills was present, however, as the defendant was ranked
nineteenth out of one hundred players in the league in scoring.55 Simi-
larly, the court considered the fact that both teams offered the player a
substantial pay raise to be indicative of special value.56 Thus, the state-
ments in both Barnett and Peters, that professional athletes possess the
requisite uniqueness merely because they are professional athletes, should
be limited in light of the evidence of unique ability in Barnett and the
concession of the issue in Peters.
Both Winnioeg Rugby Football Club v. Freeman5 7 and Dallas Cowboys
Football Club, Inc. v. Harris" have been criticized for expanding the La-
joie decision beyond its original limits or abandoning its standards alto-
gether.59 A closer analysis of those cases, however, indicates that they are
consistent with Lajoie. Winnipeg involved two athletes who, while under
contract to play for a team in the Canadian Football League, attempted to
jump to the Cleveland Browns, a team in the National Football League.
The court granted the plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief.60 Although the
evidence tended to show that the players possessed little more than ordi-
nary talent by National Football league standards, they did possess excep-
tional ability based on the standards of the Canadian League.
6
'
Furthermore, evidence was presented that the plaintiff club had designed
its team around the abilities of the defendants and that their services could
not easily be replaced. 62 This court, therefore, did evaluate the players'
skills in light of their value to the aggrieved club,63 and not by abstract
reputation standards.
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris also involved an average
player attempting to jump his contract. At trial the jury expressly found
that the player did not possess unique skills and abilities.64 On appeal,
however, the court determined that the evidence was insufficient to support
the jury finding.65 In making this determination, the court rejected the
placed from the minor leagues or the annual crop of college athletes. The standard measure
of damages, therefore, is readily available. See Comment, supra note 11, at 444.
55. 181 N.E.2d at 513-14.
56. Id at 514.
57. 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955) (two players with only average ability prevented
from jumping contracts).
58. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ) (defensive back with only
average ability prevented from jumping contract).
59. See Comment, supra note 11, at 441-43; Note, supra note 33, at 544-46. See gener-
ally Nassau v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Comment, supra note
50, at 360-61.
60. 140 F. Supp. at 367.
61. Id at 366-67.
62. Id at 367.
63. See Comment, supra note 50, at 360-61.
64. 348 S.W.2d at 42.
65. Id at 44. The contract that gave rise to the dispute contained the following lan-
guage: "The Player hereby represents that he has special, exceptional and unique
knowledge, skill and ability as a football player, the loss of which cannot be estimated with
any certainty and cannot be fairly or adequately compensated by damages. . . ." Id at 42.
The court expressly rejected the plaintiff's claim that this provision estopped Harris to deny
the fact that he possessed sufficiently unique ability. Id at 43. The basis for the court's
19811
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narrow definition of unique used in the trial court.66 Instead, the court
expressly adopted the broader rule established in Lajoie,67 and under this
standard, found the defendant to be sufficiently unique.68 The fact that the
defendant was the most skilled athlete at his position available to the
plaintiff (a new expansion club) at that time was of considerable signifi-
cance to the court's finding of sufficient uniqueness. 69 This court, like the
courts in Lajoie and Freeman, determined the player's uniqueness relative
to his value to the team and did not rely on his status as a professional
athlete.
Under the Lajoie analysis, a player is unique if he cannot easily be re-
placed.70 As illustrated by both Harris and Freeman, this test does not
mean that an average athlete can never be considered unique. Naturally,
it is easier to show a greater degree of difficulty of replacement when the
athlete is a star, but certain circumstances do exist in which the average
player cannot readily be replaced. The value-to-the-team theory,71 which
conclusion was that the statement was merely an expression of opinion. Id See also Com-
ment, supra note 50, at 358-62. For an indication of how different courts have treated these
provisions compare Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d
506, 508-13 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961) (question of fact despite contract language), and
Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 727-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1974, no writ) (case clearly raises fact question as to uniqueness despite contract lan-
guage), with Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. Minn. 1972) (player
acknowledged uniqueness in contract), and Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers,
348 F. Supp. 261, 264 (1972) (player acknowledged uniqueness in contract), remanded, 472
F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972). Despite the fact that these representations in the contracts appear
to carry little weight with the courts, most standard player contracts still contain this lan-
guage. See North American Soccer League, Club-Player Agreement art. III, § 3.1 (Oct.
1979) ("Player represents that he possesses unique knowledge and skill as a soccer player
and that his services to be rendered hereunder are of an unusual and extraordinary character
which gives them peculiar value which cannot be adequately compensated for in damages at
law."); The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Uniform Player's Contract
4.1 (Jan. 1, 1976) ("The Player represents and agrees that he has exceptional and unique skill
and ability as a baseball player .... "); National Basketball Association, Uniform Player
Contract 1 9 (June 1976) ("The Player represents and agrees that he has extraordinary and
unique skill and ability as a basketball player .... "); National Hockey League, Standard
Players Contract 6 (1974) ("The Player represents and agrees that he has exceptional and
unique knowledge, skill and ability as a hockey player .... "). The National Football
League appears to have recognized the fact that these representations are not determinative
of the player's uniqueness and, for the sake of brevity, has eliminated them from their stan-
dard player's contract. See NFL Player Contract. Copies of professional athletic contracts
can be found in REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE (PLI 1978).
66. 348 S.W.2d at 44. The definition of unique that was introduced at trial required the
player to have unparalleled or unequal skills and abilities. Id at 43.
67. Id.; see notes 46-48 supra and note 70 infra and accompanying text.
68. 348 S.W.2d at 45.
69. Id
70. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902) ("[T]he services of
the defendant are of such a unique character, and display such a special knowledge, skill,
and ability, as renders them of peculiar value to the plaintiff, and so difficult of substitution
that their loss will produce ['damages which are estimated only by conjecture, and not by
any accurate standard']."). 51 A. at 973-74 (quoting Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh & Con-
nellsville R.R., 24 Pa. 159, 160 (1854)). For a case that reaches a result similar to that in
Harris and Freeman, see Long Island Am. Ass'n Football Club v. Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.2d 858
(Sup. Ct. 1940) (not capable of replacing with a player of equal or better talent).
7 1. But see notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35
COMMENTS
emerged from the Lajoie, Freeman, and Harris decisions, is desirable be-
cause it allows for the best balancing of the competing interests. If the
player is of significant value to the aggrieved team, then the club's need for
stability and its interest in retaining the player will be protected. On the
other hand, if the player is not of significant value to that particular team,
then the player's need for exposure and a competitive market are met by
allowing him to seek out another team for which his services may have
great value.72
Additionally, the public's interest in protecting the sanctity of contracts
and prohibiting restraints of trade is furthered. Although a finding of uni-
queness is essential to the granting of the negative injunction, it alone is
not determinative.
B. Irreparable Harm and Inadequate Remedy at Law
A finding that the aggrieved team will suffer irreparable harm as a result
of the player's breach is a prerequisite for the granting of injunctive re-
lief.73 In the area of sports contracts, irreparable harm is equated with
inadequacy of damages at law, 7 4 the underlying principle being that a
court of law will not award damages that are too speculative in nature. 75
Due to the many variables present in the sports context, the awarding of
damages in these cases generally is considered to be speculative, uncertain,
and as a practical matter, impossible to ascertain. 76 In many instances,
however, the services of a player may be easily replaced; consequently, the
club does not suffer irreparable harm, and damages are ascertainable.
Some cases do suggest, however, that once the uniqueness test is passed,
the determination of irreparable harm is automatic. 77
One decision controverting the proposition that the aggrieved club nec-
essarily suffers irreparable harm due to the loss of a star player is Boston
72. See Comment, supra note 50, at 360-61.
73. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 138 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Phila-
delphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902); Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Vir-
gina Squires Basketball Club Partnership, 373 F. Supp. 946, 948 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
74. This relationship can be traced back to Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa.
210, 51 A. 973, 973-74 (1902), in which the court held that irreparable harm is present if
there is no accurate pecuniary standard for the determination of the damages. See J. WEIS-
TART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.07, at 364 (1st ed. 1979).
75. See 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1142, at 117.
76. See Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 472 F.2d 127, 128 (1st Cir.
1972); Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 246 (1969); J. WEIS-
TART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.02, at 337-38.
77. See Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. Minn. 1972); Washington
Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. 1193, 1197-98 (N.D. Cal.), af'd, 419
F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Virginia Squires Basket-
ball Club Partnership, 373 F. Supp. 946, 948-49 (W.D. Tex. 1974). This result appears to be
what the court in Lajoie intended. The logical implication of Lajoie is that a finding of
uniqueness is equated with a finding of an inadequate remedy at law. Stated differently, if
an adequate remedy exists at law, i.e., a suitable replacement is readily available and the
only real difference will be that of salary, then the defendant player is not sufficiently
unique. See Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973, 973-74 (1902); note 70
supra and accompanying text.
1981]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
Professional Hockey Association v. Cheevers.78 Cheevers involved two
hockey players, entering their option year with the Boston Bruins, who
wanted to jump from that team in the National Hockey League to new
teams in the World Hockey Association. 79 The Bruins sought a prelimi-
nary injunction against the players. The court denied such relief on the
basis that the club failed to show it would otherwise suffer irreparable
harm.80 Although it noted that the plaintiff was a popular sports team, the
court considered it to be primarily a corporate entity formed for the pur-
pose of making a profit.81 The court's only concern, therefore, was with
the potential harm to the team's financial health, and not whether the
team's standings or its chances of winning the Stanley Cup would be
harmed by the loss of these particular players.8 2 The issue was simply
whether the club would suffer any irreparable financial harm.83 After re-
viewing the plaintiffs financial statements, the court concluded there was
no showing that the club would suffer the requisite irreparable harm.84
Furthermore, the evidence showed that the financial impact, if any, of the
players' departure on the plaintiff club was unknown and could not be
proven.85 Despite this conclusion, the court stated that if the defendants
had breached a valid contract, the plaintiff had a complete and adequate
remedy at law in the form of a suit for money damages.86
Cheevers is different from other sports contract cases in that the court
rested its decision solely upon the potential impact of the player's breach
on the club's financial position.8 7 The court did not consider how easily or
adequately the players could be replaced.88 The burden imposed on ag-
grieved clubs by this type of analysis is more difficult than that required by
prior cases because it requires a showing of actual financial harm, instead
78. 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972).
79. Their original contract contained the standard reserve clause whereby the plaintiff
was allowed to retain the players' services for an additional year after the expiration of the
original contract. 348 F. Supp. at 264. The Bruins, in compliance with the terms of their
contracts, had tendered new contracts to the players. Id
80. 348 F. Supp. at 270. The motion was also denied on the grounds that the Bruins
failed to show a probability of success on the merits. Id at 265-67. This requirement does
not mean that the plaintiff must show that he necessarily will win. Rather, the courts gener-
ally require some evidence of a legitimate claim. See Washington Capitols Basketball Club,
Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal.), aft'd, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969) (plain-
tiff must show probability of success in order to win preliminary injunction); Matuszak v.
Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no
writ) (plaintiff must show probable right to permanent injunction on final hearing); World
Football League v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1974, writ ref d, n.r.e.) (plaintiff must show only that he has cause of action).




85. Id Interestingly, the court's remarks concerning the uncertain nature of the poten-
tial damages to the plaintiff should indicate the appropriateness of granting the injunction.
See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3,
§ 4.08, at 366.
86. 348 F. Supp. at 269.




of the mere loss of an important player. 89 The efficacy of this approach,
however, is questionable 90 because the appellate court remanded the case
and seriously questioned the lower court's position on the question of
damages.9' In any event, this case indicates the possibility that courts may
be receptive to the argument that an adequate remedy at law is available to
the aggrieved club when a player breaches his contract.
II. A POTENTIAL NEW REMEDY-DAMAGES
A4. Actual and Consequential Damages
For purposes of obtaining an injunction, once an athlete is shown to be
sufficiently unique, irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law
generally are presumed due to the speculative nature of the damages.92 In
some cases, however, the presumption that damages are indeterminable
may not be valid. Moreover, a team may desire damages rather than an
injunction for several reasons. If a player is successfully enjoined from
playing for another team, he still may be content to sit out for the period of
the injunction. 93 If this occurs, the club not only loses the services of the
player but also receives no compensation for his loss. Additionally, the
prospect of having to pay damages to the aggrieved club may deter some
athletes from breaching their contracts.
The availability of money damages gives the aggrieved club greater flex-
ibility.94 It can seek an injunction hoping that if granted, the player would
be persuaded to finish his contractual obligation to the club.95 If, however,
the club believed that the odds of obtaining an injunction were small, that
the player was likely to sit out if the injunction was granted, or that it
really did not want the player back, it could wait and recover the dam-
ages.96
In deciding whether to allow recovery of money damages for the breach
of a professional sports contract, the courts must decide whether the dam-
ages suffered by the team are ascertainable or are too speculative and un-
certain to be determined. This decision requires consideration of what
specific items would be recoverable and the amount to be awarded for
89. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. The type of analysis is favorable to a
player because it makes obtaining the negative injunction more difficult for a club. This
tends to promote both increased player mobility and a more competitive market for player
salaries. The club's position, however, would be adversely affected because its stability
would be harmed if a considerable number of players were allowed to ignore their obliga-
tions. Public concerns for the sanctity of contracts would also suffer.
90. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.08, at 366.
91. See Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 472 F.2d 127, 128 (1st Cir.
1972). The case was remanded for determination of certain issues raised on appeal but not
dealt with at the trial. Id at 127-28.
92. See notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 (1969)
(pla r accepted new team's offer to pay salary even if he was enjoined).
4. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.09, at 367.
95. See id § 4.02, at 340.
96. See id § 4.09, at 367.
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each.97 The first item that should be considered is the cost of substitu-
tion.98 When dealing with an athlete who is replaced, any salary in excess
of the defendant's that the club must pay to obtain a replacement is readily
determinable by the club and, accordingly, can be established in court.99
Similarly, the expenses incurred while searching for and negotiating with a
replacement can be substantiated. 100 In such situations, damages should
be recoverable. In fact, obtaining an injunction would be unlikely because
the player was replaceable and, therefore, the club was not irreparably
harmed by his breach.
Problems arise, however, when the defendant is a star player. The gen-
eral objection to awarding damages in this situation is that they would be
too uncertain and speculative.' 0 ' This notion, however, involves a broader
view of the aggrieved club's injury than is necessary. It is the possible
consequential damages, such as loss of revenues from a decline in fan at-
tendance and potential playoff rewards, that are speculative. The loss of a
player, however, creates a vacant spot on the team that will be filled with
the best player available. The club may be able to obtain the services of
another star athlete who is available, but at a higher price than the defend-
ant. Even if the cost of the replacement player does not exceed the cost of
the defendant's contract, the costs incident to his hiring should be recover-
able. ' 02 Although these damages may not fully compensate the club, they
are both ascertainable and better than no compensation at all, which is the
result when injunctive relief is applied.
Few cases have considered the questions of what items of damages
might be available or how to calculate the amounts to be awarded. In
Lemat Corp. v. Barry 103 the club sought to recover lost ticket revenues that
it claimed were a result of the defendant's sitting out the injunction against
him. 104 Although the damages were denied because the team was not enti-
tled to both an injunction and damages,10 5 the method of calculation may
be a possibility for other plaintiffs. The trial court concluded that the
97. See id § 4.09, at 367-69.
98. See id § 4.09, at 367.
99. See id § 4.07, at 360. See generally id § 4.02, at 337; U.C.C. § 2-713.
100. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-713 to -715.
101. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
102. See generally U.C.C. § 2-715.
103. 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969). This case did not discuss the cost of
substitution issues. Rick Barry scored 2,059 points in his rookie year in the NBA for an
average of 25.7 points per game. His rebounds added up to 850. He was named rookie of
the year for the 1965-1966 season and went on to become one of the best basketball players
of all time. See THE MODERN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASKETBALL 285 (1969).
104. 80 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
105. Id at 246. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial of damages stating:
The record clearly indicates that the [trial] court's denial of damages was
based on its view that the remedies sought [both damages and an injunction)
should be considered as alternatives. Lemat's claim for damages could ac-
quire significance only if its request for injunctive relief was denied or was
found to be not appropriate under the circumstances.
[Vol. 35
COMMENTS
plaintiff had been injured in the amount of $365,000.106 This figure repre-
sents the difference between the actual gross receipts for the season that
Barry did not play and a projected amount that would have been received
had he participated. 0 7 The amount of the projected receipts was calcu-
lated by multiplying the immediately preceding year's gross receipts by the
average percentage growth rate of receipts for the entire National Basket-
ball Association during the year in question, less additional costs that
would have been incurred had Barry played. The result was a $365,000
decline in revenues.10 8 The appellate court neither rejected nor approved
this method of calculating damages.' 09 The court remarked by way of a
dictum, however, that damages in these cases were speculative, uncertain,
and practically impossible to prove. 1°
A different approach to the damages of an injured team is illustrated in
Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc. Ill The club sought to recover busi-
ness losses resulting from the player's absence during one season. 1 2 Re-
covery was sought not only for losses incurred during the year that
Tomjanovich missed but also for losses incurred in the immediately suc-
ceeding year." 13 The current year losses included lost revenues due to a
decline in fan attendance and the loss of playoff participation rewards." 
4
The plaintiff calculated the current year loss caused by the decline in fan
attendance' '5 by subtracting the average per game walk-up sales receipts
106. Id at 243.
107. Id
108. Id The rate used was 25%.
109. See id at 246.
110. Id
Ill. No. 78-243 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1979).
112. The case involved two plaintiffs. Rudy Tomjanovich brought suit on his own behalf
for injuries received from a blow to his face during a basketball game with the Los Angeles
Lakers. The owner of the Houston Rockets, the team for which Tomjanovich played at the
time, sued the Lakers to recover damages that it suffered as a result of the injured Tomja-
novich's absence for the majority of the season. Although this is a tort case, the Rockets
were seeking compensation for injuries sustained due to the player's absence from the team.
Thus, many of the methods of calculating damages should be applicable to contract cases.
Both cases were consolidated for the trial of liability issues. For the purposes of this Com-
ment references to the plaintiff in this case refer to the Houston Rockets. In each of the three
seasons since his injury, Tomjanovich's performance has failed to equal his pre-injury stan-
dards. See Casstevens, Rudy T's New World, Dallas Morning News, Mar. 25, 1981, § B, at
1, col. 2.
113. See Houston Rockets Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, exhibit I, Tomjanovich
v. California Sports, Inc., No. 78-243 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Sum-
mary of Business Loss Exhibits]. The information and materials used to discuss the damage
issues in this case were provided by the accounting firm of Touche Ross & Co., Carl Taylor
accountant. The evidence concerning the damages in this case was calculated primarily by
Carl Taylor and presented at trial by Pat Loconto, also an accountant with Touche Ross &
Co., Dallas, Texas.
114. Interview with Carl Taylor, Accountant, Touche Ross & Co., in Dallas, Texas (Sept.
29, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Taylor Interview]; see Summary of Business Loss Exhibits,
supra note 113, exhibits VII & VIII. The decline in fan attendance involves only the drop in
walk-up ticket sales. Season ticket revenues were not affected during the current year.
115. To illustrate a noticeable decline in fan attendance, the club compared the average
number of paid admissions per game before the injury with the average number of paid
admissions per game after the injury. The result was a 10.3% decline in average paid admis-
sions. See Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, supra note 113, exhibit I. Plaintiff also com-
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for games in which Tomjanovich did not play from the average per game
receipts for games that he did play,'1 6 multiplying the difference by the
number of games in which he did not play," 7 and subtracting additional
expenses that would have been incurred if the fan attendance had been at
the higher level.1 8 The resulting figure was the loss in net walk-up sales
receipts.119 These calculations differ120 from those used in Lemat.
Lemat's basis for projecting revenues was based on the positive growth in
attendance throughout the league,' 2' whereas in Tomjanovich the calcula-
tions focused on the specific negative impact on the club. Which method is
less speculative is certainly arguable. The Tomjanovich method, however,
may approach actual damages more closely because it takes into account
more factors specifically affecting the aggrieved club.
In Tomjanovich the club also sought to recover for lost revenues in the
subsequent year due to a decline in the growth of season ticket sales, 122
allegedly due to the poor season that the Rockets had without Tomja-
novich. 23 The plaintiff calculated these damages by multiplying the ac-
tual number of tickets sold in the subsequent year by an additional growth
rate 24 that would have been realized had Tomjanovich not been in-
jured. 25 To justify the use of the growth rate, the club relied on the fact
that season ticket sales for the current year had grown more than 100 per-
cent over the prior year, but grew only one percent in the subsequent
year.' 26 Multiplying the projected number of additional tickets that would
have been sold by the average price of season tickets resulted in the
amount of additional season ticket subscription revenues that would have
been realized. 27 Finally, by subtracting the additional related expenses
that would have been incurred had Tomjanovich played, the loss of net
pared the change in total walk-up sales revenues from the preceding year to the current year,
and the current year to the subsequent year. Total walk-up sales in the current year declined
33.6% compared with the preceding year. The total sales increased 38.1% in the subsequent
year compared with the current year. See id
116. See Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, supra note 113, exhibit VII. Although the
figures used for comparison were from the same year, it would be possible to make similar
comparisons using prior year and current year numbers.
117. See id These losses were adjusted downward to compensate for portions of losses
that were attributable to periodic games missed by other important players during the sea-
son. Taylor Interview, supra note 114.
118. See Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, supra note 113, exhibit VII.
119. Id
120. They are similar in that both recognize that the club is injured by a decline in fan
attendance. If the player is of lesser ability, then this element will not be recoverable.
Whether fan attendance is affected also should be reflected in statistics. The percentages in
Tomjanovich indicate that the loss of the player had a significant impact on fan attendance.
See note 115 supra.
121. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
122. See Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, supra note 113, exhibits I, IV, V. The
growth from the prior year to the current year was 164.20%. The growth in the subsequent
year was 1.25%. See id exhibit IV.
123. Taylor Interview, supra note 114.
124. The figure used, 10%, was considered to be a conservative estimate. Id
125. Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, supra note 113, exhibit V.
126. Id exhibit IV.
127. Id exhibit V.
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season ticket subscription revenue was determined. 128 Although this ele-
ment of damages does have some degree of uncertainty, the statistics show
that the team's performance in one year has a substantial impact on season
ticket sales the following year. 129 Where the evidence clearly indicates
that the plaintiff team did in fact suffer this type of harm, the aggrieved
club should be able to recover some damages.
A third form of damages sought by the club involved the lost revenues
resulting from the inability to increase the price of tickets in the subse-
quent year. 130 Although the policy in the past was to increase ticket prices
each year,'31 the club felt that because of the poor season during the cur-
rent year, the club could not justify any significant price increases in the
subsequent year. 132 To compute these damages, the plaintiff multiplied a
projected percentage increase in prices 133 that otherwise would have been
justifiable by the total ticket revenues in the subsequent year, 134 and ad-
justed the product for additional related expenses that would have been
incurred. 135 This resulted in the projected net revenues, from which actual
net revenues in the subsequent year were subtracted. 136 Although the fail-
ure to increase prices was a conscious business decision, the reason for the
decision was the team's poor performance in the current year, which man-
agement claimed resulted from the loss of Tomjanovich. 137
Perhaps the most speculative type of damages that the plaintiff sought to
recover were those resulting from lost playoff participation. 138 First, the
club determined that Tomjanovich's net scoring contribution was slightly
more than five points per game. 139 Fifteen games in the current year were
lost by five points or less after Tomjanovich's injury. 140 If those games had
been won, the Rockets would have qualified for the first round of the play-
offs.141 The club sought to recover lost ticket sales and media coverage
revenues that would have been received had the Rockets played in the first
round. ' 42
128. Id
129. See notes 122, 126 supra and accompanying text.
130. See Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, 5upra note 113, exhibits I, II, III.
131. Taylor Interview, supra note 114. The average increase in the price of tickets for the
prior year was 12.53%. The increase for the current year was 19.85%. The growth for the
subsequent year was 0.77%. In the second subsequent year the increase was 7.68%. See
Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, supra note 113, exhibit II.
132. Taylor Interview, supra note 114.
133. The figure used, 9%, was considered to be a conservative estimate. Id
134. See Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, supra note 113, exhibit III.
135. Id
136. Id
137. Taylor Interview, supra note 114.
138. See Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, supra note 113, exhibits I, VIII.
139. Id exhibit VIII. On the average the opponents outscored the Rockets by 5.17 points
more without Tomjanovich than they did with him in the game. Id In calculating these
figures they did not include games in which Moses Malone, another important player, did
not participate. Id
140. See id.
141. Taylor Interview, smupra note 114. The information was based on the Rockets Offi-
cial Media Information Booklet and the Official NBA Guide. Id
142. See Summary of Business Loss Exhibits, supra note 113, exhibit IX. The club only
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All of the preceding types of damages are illustrative of those a club
may suffer as a result of the loss of a star player. Arguably, many of these
calculations are speculative, but they are a starting point for future plain-
tiffs. Although the plaintiff actually presented the evidence concerning
these damages at trial, the defendant agreed to a settlement before any
holdings were made concerning the accuracy or availability of any of these
damages. Thus, predicting how this or any other court would rule on these
claims is difficult.
B. Alternative Forms of Damages
Liquidated damages are a possible alternative to actual damages, al-
though case law only suggests that such a provision might be enforceable
against the player.143 The availability of liquidated damages would allow
the club to recover some of the damages it suffers from the loss of a
player,'" and would serve as a deterrent against the player's breaching of
his contract.' 45 On the other hand, liquidated damages would provide the
player with greater mobility and opportunity to perform.146
Another proposed remedy is to award the aggrieved team the difference
in salary between the player's then existing contract and his new contract
with a different club.' 47 One significant advantage of this remedy is that
the amounts are readily available.148 In addition, this approach approxi-
mates the standard measure of contract damages.' 49 Several policy rea-
sons favor this approach. First, the club is benefitted because it will
receive some compensation for the lost player.'50 Additionally, any im-
mediate financial incentive for the player to abandon his contract is elimi-
nated.' 5' Finally, the player's mobility and opportunity for exposure are
increased because he is not faced with the prospect of the negative injunc-
tion. One drawback is the potential adverse affect on the stability of player
contracts. The negative injunction, however, would still be available to the
club; the club simply would have a broader choice of remedies to pursue.
III. PLAYER DEFENSES
The fact that the aggrieved club may prevail on the uniqueness and ir-
reparable injury issues does not necessarily guarantee that a negative in-
claimed to make it to the first round because they thought it too speculative to go beyond
that point. Taylor Interview, supra note 114.
143. See Connecticut Professional Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618, 619-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). See generaly Comment, supra note 22, at 59; Comment, supra note 11, at
455-56.
144. See Comment, supra note 11, at 455.
145. Id at 455-56.
146. Id
147. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.09, at 368-69.
148. See id § 4.09, at 368.
149. See id




junction will be granted. The player still has several defenses available.
These defenses include lack of mutuality and unclean hands.
A. Mutuality
In the early sports contracts cases, lack of mutuality was the most fre-
quently attempted defense to the club's suit for a negative injunction.1 52
Two basic mutuality theories have been used in the sports context. The
first theory involves lack of mutuality of obligation.1 53 Under this theory
the courts are concerned with the fact that the player might be bound to
perform for the team for many years, but the team is only obligated for a
minimal amount of time.' 54 The second mutuality theory involves lack of
mutuality of remedy.' 55 The concern here is that although the club may
obtain specific performance of the player's negative promise, as a practical
matter, the remedy of specific performance is not available to the player.' 56
Both of these problems arose in Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie.' 57 In
Lajoie the court found that the contract contained the requisite mutuality
of obligation despite the fact that the club could bind the player for up to
three years while the player only could bind the club for ten days.' 58 Con-
sidering the peculiar nature and circumstances of professional baseball, the
court found that these terms were not unreasonable. 59 Furthermore, both
parties expressly accepted the terms at the beginning of their contractual
relationship, and they constituted a part of the inducement for the club to
contract with the player.' 60 The court disposed of the mutuality of remedy
problem by holding that the fact that both parties did not have the same
remedies available in case of a breach by the other did not destroy mutual-
ity. 161
152. See Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich.), a f'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914);
Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1902); Metropolitan Exhibition
Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779, 781 (Sup. Ct. 1890); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3,
§ 4.11, at 373; Comment, supra note 11, at 448; Note, supra note 31, at 546.
153. See American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct.
1914); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.11, at 376-77.
154. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.11, at 376-77. The authors discuss
Chase as a leading case on this point. In Chase the court stated that "the negative covenant,
under such circumstances, is without a consideration to support it, and is unenforceable by
injunction." American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 452, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 14
(Sup. Ct. 1914).
155. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.11, at 377-81; Comment, supra
note 10, at 448. The same judicial remedy should be available to both parties; if one party
seeks specific performance, the other party must also be able to receive specific performance
before a court of equity will grant injunctive relief. See J. WEiSTART & C. LOWELL, supra
note 3, § 4.11, at 377-78.
156. See Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich.), aff'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914);
J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.11, at 377-78; Comment, supra note 11, at 448.
The club's ability to terminate the contract on short notice effectively prevents the player
from obtaining specific performance, thus there is no real mutuality of remedy. See J. WEIS-
TART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 411, at 377-78.
157. 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902); see notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
158. 51 A. at 975.





Although not immediately adopted as the majority rule, 162 Lajoie effec-
tively marked the end of the mutuality defense in sports contracts cases. 163
The Restatement of Contracts strengthened this position by stating that
"[tihe fact that the remedy of specific enforcement is not available to one
party is not a sufficient reason for refusing it to the other party."' 164
A subsequent case indicates, however, that the issue of mutuality is not
dead. 165 In Connecticut Professional Sports Corp. v. Heyman 166 the court
found that the contract in dispute lacked the requisite mutuality because
the club easily could avoid any obligation to the player. 167 Several factors
were determinative. First, the contract contained a provision allowing the
club to end the contract whenever it desired. Additionally, the contract
entitled the player to participate only in those games in which the club
requested his services. This fact was significant because the player re-
ceived compensation only for those games in which he participated or
dressed for. Furthermore, the club had no obligation to compensate the
player if he was injured. Finally, the contract did not specify any mini-
mum number of games to be scheduled.168 Although discussed as a mutu-
ality case, 169 Heyman also may be viewed as an example of the
unconscionability defense.170 Lack of mutuality, however, is not the only
defense available to the player.
B. Unclean Hands
In some cases, players have successfully used the principle of unclean
hands in defending against suits for negative injunction. 171 The thrust of
this doctrine is that a court of equity will not grant relief to a plaintiff who
has acted inequitably or in bad faith regarding the matter being 1iti-
162. See Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich.), affid, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914);
Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1902); American Base Bali &
Athletic Exhibition Co. v. Harper, 54 CENT. L.J. 449 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis 1902); J. WEISTART
& C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.11, at 380; Note, supra note 33, at 546.
163. See Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506,
512 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961) (fact that club could bind player to contract longer than
player could bind club did not mean that there was no mutuality); J. WEISTART & C. Low-
ELL, supra note 3, § 4.11, at 380; Comment, supra note 50, at 363; Note, supra note 33, at 546.
164. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 372.
165. See Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (mutuality basic
requirement for enforcement of sports contracts); Connecticut Professional Sports Corp. v.
Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (finding that contract lacked mutuality due
to harshness of terms).
166. 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
167. Id at 621.
168. Id
169. See Comment, supra note 50, at 363; Comment, supra note 11, at 449-50.
170. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.11, at 381-83.
171. See New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc.,
291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961); Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979
(M.D.N.C. 1969); Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich.), a'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir.
1914); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.12, at 388; Comment, supra note 50, at
369-7 1; Comment, supra note 11, at 450-5 1; Note, supra note 33, at 549.
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gated.172 Because the doctrine only considers the behavior of the plain-
tiff,173 a defendant may raise this defense regardless of his own conduct.1
74
The issue of unclean hands usually arises in two situations.
175
The first situation is when a player abandons 76 one team for another,
later returns to the original team, and the second team brings suit to en-
force its contract. 177 In Weegham v. K/lifer 178 the plaintiff club persuaded
the player to jump his existing contract and sign with it. 179 Later the
player changed his mind and re-signed with his original team.'80 The
plaintiff sought a negative injunction challenging the enforceability of the
first contract with the original club.' 8 ' The court refused to grant the in-
junction on the grounds of unclean hands,' 82 noting that even if the player
did not have a legal obligation to play for the original club during the
years in dispute, he at least had a moral obligation to play for them during
that time. 183 Signing the player to a contract for those years and knowing
of his obligation, marked the plaintiff club with unclean hands.'84 In the
more recent case of Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 85 involving essen-
tially the same facts, 186 the court adopted the reasoning of Weegham and
denied the negative injunction. 187
Both Weegham and Hudson involved plaintiffs who had signed players
to contracts to be performed while the player had time remaining on his
original contract. A different situation is presented, however, if the
player's new contract does not obligate him to begin with the new team
172. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 815 (1945).
173. See id at 815; J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.12, at 383-84.
174. See Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979, 990 (M.D.N.C. 1969)
(allowing unclean hands defense despite fact that player had jumped two successive con-
tracts). But see Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472, 479 (9th
Cir. 1969). The court in Barry rejected the player's unclean hands defense after it noted that
his inconsistency and contract jumping overshadowed any questionable activities on the
plaintiff's part. Id This case, however, involved a future service contract. Courts have held
that the negotiation of a future service contract does not mark the plaintiff with unclean
hands. See notes 188-89 infra and accompanying text.
175. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.12, at 384.
176. The player may be under a current obligation to play for the original club. See
Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969); Weegham v. Kille-
fer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich.), afl'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914). He may simply sign, however,
a future services contract with a different team. See Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457
F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972).
177. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.12, at 384; Comment, supra note
11, at 450.
178. 215 F. 168, 168-73 (W.D. Mich.), aft'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914).
179. 215 F. at 170.
180. Id
181. The original contract was probably unenforceable due to a lack of mutuality.
182. 215 F. at 173.
183. Id at 172-73.
184. Id
185. 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
186. Id at 980-86.
187. Id at 990.
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until his first contract expires. 18 Although only a few cases have
presented this question, the courts generally have decided that negotiating
with and signing players to future service contracts does not mark a club
with unclean hands.' 89
The unclean hands problem may arise when contracts are signed in se-
cret.190 In Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely' 191 and New York Football Giants,
Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc. 192 the clubs signed players
to contracts after their last collegiate regular season game, but before re-
maining bowl games were to be played. 193 Under existing National Col-
legiate Athletic Association rules a player lost his eligibility to play at the
college level if he signed a professional contract. 94 In order to allow the
players to play in their bowl games, both plaintiffs agreed to keep the sign-
ings secret. 195 In both cases the players changed their minds, signed con-
tracts with other teams, and sought to avoid their original contracts. 96
The court in New York Football Giants, Inc. denied the negative injunction
on the grounds that the secret signing impugned the plaintiff with unclean
hands.' 97 In this case, however, the plaintiff broke its promise not to sub-
mit the contract for approval before the bowl game. 198 In Neely the court
rejected the unclean hands defense, noting that although secret signing is a
regrettable practice, negotiating the contract at any time is not illegal, and
this conduct does not allow athletes the right to ignore their contracts. 99
The decision in Neely indicates a strong desire by some courts to protect
the sanctity of these contracts. A major distinction, however, appears to be
that in Neely the plaintiff kept its promise of secrecy, 2°° whereas, in New
York Football Giants, Inc. the plaintiff broke its promise to the player.201
The defense of unclean hands may be available to the player in an ac-
tion for negative injunction. The situations in which this defense is appli-
cable, however, are limited to cases wherein the plaintiff club itself has
188. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.12, at 385-86; Comment, supra
note 50, at 370.
189. See Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721, 724 (4th Cir. 1972); Washington
Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1969); World Football
League v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dal-
las 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Interestingly, in both Cunningham and Barry the plaintiff had
agreed with the player that he could begin playing with the club during his option year, but
he was not obligated to do so.
190. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.12, at 384.
191. 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840 (1966).
192. 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961).
193. 361 F.2d at 39; 291 F.2d at 473.
194. 361 F.2d at 39; 291 F.2d at 472; J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 3, § 4.12, at
389 (a general discussion of the rule and these cases).
195. 361 F.2d at 39; 291 F.2d at 473.
196. 361 F.2d at 39; 291 F.2d at 473.
197. 291 F.2d at 474. The court was concerned with the deceptive practices used by the
plaintiff to induce the player to sign. Id at 472, 474.
198. Id at 473.
199. 361 F.2d at 41-42.
200. Id at 40, 42.
201. 291 F.2d at 473.
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acted inequitably with regard to the contract in dispute. Thus, in the ordi-
nary case the player will not be able to use this defense.
IV. CONCLUSION
The existence of the professional sports industry is dependent upon the
contractual relationship between a club and its players. The historic rem-
edy available to the aggrieved club for a player's breach of his contract has
been the negative injunction. In deciding whether a negative injunction is
proper, courts should not look solely to the player's status as a professional
athlete or other abstract factors, but rather should consider the athlete's
value relative to the needs of the aggrieved club. By using this method of
analysis, the needs of the aggrieved club, the player, and the public can
best be protected.
Although the traditional remedy in these cases is the negative injunc-
tion, recent decisions indicate the possibility of an aggrieved club's recov-
ering damages resulting from a player's breach of his contract. The
methods used to calculate damages in these cases may be considered spec-
ulative, but they provide a basis from which future plaintiffs can build.
The availability of the damages remedy gives the aggrieved club greater
flexibility in dealing with a breaching player and further protects the needs
of all interested parties.
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